




WHAT WE OUGHT TO DO ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT



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GUIDELINES FOR A WESTERN AND MORE SPECIFICALLY A BRITISH POLICY
TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION

I Introduction: The Sources of Soviet Expansionism

- i) The fundamental reason why the Soviet Union represents a permanent threat to the freedom of the British and other western peoples is the nature of the Soviet regime itself.

- ii) The legitimacy of government in human societies usually rests on one of the following principles: divine right of monarchs (at present found only in a few Arab states, but leaving some traces in constitutional monarchies); popular sovereignty expressed through elected assemblies of some sort; and mere force (in various African and Latin American dictatorships). The legitimacy of the Soviet government derives from none of these, though its champions would claim that it has some characteristics of the second type, and it certainly possesses some of the third.

- iii) Government in the Soviet Union is based on Marxism-Leninism, which its spokesmen claim to be an exact science of human society, "scientific" in the same sense as chemistry. This science is, however, the exclusive possession of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whose members are the heirs of the former associates of the Great Lenin, leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917. Its members have been appointed from time to time since 1917 by the party leadership, inheriting their exclusive scientific wisdom by a process roughly analogous to that by which, through the laying on of hands, bishops have inherited the wisdom of St. Peter.

- iv) If one asks what is the evidence that the insurrection of 1917 was indeed a Great October Socialist Revolution, dividing the history of the human race to the same degree as the birth of Jesus Christ or the flight from Mecca of the Prophet Muhammad, the answer is that Lenin said so. If one asks for evidence of exclusive possession by the party leadership in Lenin's lifetime of Marxist science - renamed "Marxism-Leninism" after his death - the answer is that Lenin imputed this wisdom to that leadership, of which he was the creator. The origin of the infallibility on which Soviet government rests is thus the (non-divine) revelation to one individual.
- v) It is the declared belief of Soviet Marxist-Leninists that "socialism", of which the Soviet regime is the sole true model, is destined to spread to the ends of the earth. It is, however, the duty of Marxist-Leninists to accelerate the process by all means within their power. Those who believed that Marxists should or could simply wait for historical destiny to fulfil itself, were recipients of some of Lenin's most savage polemics; and insistence on activism has not diminished since Lenin died.
- vi) The motivation of Soviet revolution-mongers has altered in sixty years, but their principles have not. The activities of the Comintern - or (Third) Communist International - in the 1920s were conducted largely by professional revolutionaries, dedicated to their cause for its own sake rather than for what they could get out of it. The Soviet leaders of to-day are beati possidentes, determined to preserve the power, privilege and wealth which party leadership has brought them, and when possible to increase them. There is nothing

at all starry-eyed about them. They exude respectability and solid self-righteous complacency. They are rulers of an empire with dependent territories in the Caribbean, in south-west and eastern Africa as well as in Central Europe. They have become accustomed to respect and fear all over the world. After the Spaniards, French, British, Germans and North Americans, it is their turn to be top-dogs in the world.

- vii) This parvenu arrogance, which in some ways recalls William II's Germany, is not in conflict with the pursuit of "socialist" revolution or with a defensive preoccupation with security. The obsession of William II with Einkreisung (encirclement by Great Britain, France and Russia) has its parallel in the Soviet horror at the contacts between the United States and China, hemming in the Soviet Union on two sides.
- viii) In the 1920s all communists in the world had the duty of protecting Soviet Russia because it was temporarily the headquarters of world revolution. In the 1980s the expansion of the Soviet empire is identical with the progress of "socialism". Distinction between the security of the USSR as a state and the cause of revolution is meaningless in the age of inter-continental missiles. There can be no security for the USSR as long as there is a single state independent of its influence, and only the instalment of a Soviet-type government can end such independence. The Soviet leaders do not expect to achieve world domination in the foreseeable future; they have to live in an imperfect world with incomplete security, but both revolution and security impel them to the same goal of

expansion whenever possible.

- ix) All governments not dominated by Soviet influence are regarded as enemies. Enemies can best be handled by dividing them from each other, and by intensifying the conflicts which exist between them. Military strength and diplomatic skills are used to this end. It is always preferable to win by political manoeuvre but if the use of force cannot be avoided, the means must be, and are, at hand.

- x) Soviet enmity never weakens. The charming manners of which Soviet diplomats are capable, the genuine friendliness of visiting Soviet scientists, the brilliant performances of touring Soviet musicians and dancers, and the inquisitive amiability of ordinary Soviet citizens in their homeland, do not alter the basic fact. The unending stream of hate propoganda with which the Soviet leaders regale their own public is the best proof. Lesser streams are also directed at "Third World" peoples and at United Nations audiences. The enemy is called by different names: "capitalism", international bankers, multi-national corporations, the "imperialists" and sometimes specifically the United States, Germany, Britain or other offending states. The enmity remains.

- xi) Unlimited expansion is inherent in the nature of the regime. It is the result not of impulsive aggression - which can be found from time to time in the historical record of most traditional state governments - but of an outlook profoundly different from that of all traditional governments. The view expressed in the West that

the Soviet leaders have abandoned their Marxist-Leninist beliefs is not supported by the evidence: whether their subjects, workers or educated persons outside politics, believe them, is another matter. Their faith appears to be supported by the success of the USSR as a military power, with the essential industrial infrastructure necessary for military strength. Few of the leaders are themselves ideological experts (the late Suslov being perhaps an exception); but medieval Europe was seldom ruled by theologians. The system works well for the rulers, and they accept its underlying principles.

- xii) The Soviet communist leaders set themselves no time-table, they are merely permanently vigilant in the conduct of an unilateral war with the rest of the world, which the rest of the world does not recognise as being a war. In this way they will not resort to force if they can achieve their purposes without it, and they will not allow their devotion to long-term aims to prevent them from seizing a short-term gain when the chance arises. They will mark time, if they have to, and retreat if necessary; but the bargains which they make with their enemies are never compromises, only armistices. The western mind expects compromises: each of the contracting parties gives up something in order to achieve agreement. The Soviet mind is not interested in agreement, either short-term or long-term, and Soviet communists never give up. A halt in the march is accepted when necessary. It is used only to recover and increase strength before resuming the march to the same goal.
- xiii) Nevertheless, it is possible to hope, and this is indeed the best

hope that the West can have, that if, over a period of decades, the Soviet leaders are compelled to accept nothing but halts and retreats, the mentality of the new generations may change, and first principles may be re-examined, both above and below.

II The Basis of Soviet Policy

Against this fundamental background the operational principles of Soviet policy are:

- i) the preservation of Soviet power at home; the stabilisation in military terms and later effective political influence over the Soviet-American relationship; the domination of the whole of Europe; the recovery of control over China and its version of communism; and the acquisition of at least predominant influence over the rest of the world, especially those areas which are close to the Soviet border; much of this policy will be planned and executed on a largely opportunistic basis;
- ii) All aspects of state and public activity - e.g. security, military, industrial, trade, consumer and even sporting policy - are subordinated to the first aim of preserving the Soviet system under the co-ordination of the communist party, and particularly its International Department and the Politburo;
- iii) In general, considerations which concern the preservation of Soviet internal power predominate over all others. This principle is particularly important in Soviet relations with its satellites:

the fear of relaxation of party control in these is determined not so much by ideology, as by apprehension of the infection spreading to the Soviet Union itself;

- iv) Military conflict is to be avoided. Military build-up is primarily political in intent. It is a trial of nerves by a country which has no public opinion against countries where public opinion, and hence a natural fear of war, are permanent features. The aim is to ensure domination, through apprehension caused by Soviet pre-eminent strength, in countries which have become disarmed through the effects of fear - on the basis of the maxim of Clausewitz that the most successful conqueror is the one who captures a city without firing a shot (endorsed by Lenin in 1915);

- v) One aspect of the policy of winning without fighting is the art of inducing the West to work for its own destruction. This is in part achieved by propaganda - both overt and clandestine - and by covert actions such as support of terrorist activities and of 'wars of liberation'. Promoting and encouraging divisions within NATO are another important aspect. But since Lenin, trade has been recognised as a potent instrument for tempting the capitalists to construct Soviet might.

III War, Peace and Ideological Aggression

- i) The demarcation line in Soviet thinking between war and peace is deliberately thin and undefined. The Soviet leaders believe Clausewitz's maxim that war is a continuation of policy by other means but, more important, they also believe that peace is a mere continuation of war by other means. Soviet peace-policy thus incorporates a war-policy. Ours does not. The Soviet concept of détente envisages the continuation of the 'international class struggle' at all levels save the military, and the collapse of the 'bourgeois-capitalist order'. Our view of détente does not envisage the destruction of the Soviet system. Using Marxism-Leninism as its passport, the Soviet Union demands world-wide acceptance as history's driving force towards a classless society and, through it, universal peace. We have no such claim and no such passport. Indeed, the current war under the aegis of détente is being fought by one Boris Ponomarev, the very experienced member of the Communist party of the Soviet Union who deals with foreign communist parties, wrote recently:

"The acuteness of class contradictions in the capitalist system as a whole . . . the instability of the situation and the dissatisfaction of the masses in many bourgeois states have today reached such a pitch that at any moment, in one link or another of this system, a situation may arise which will open the way to radical revolutionary transformations. In these situations, the role of the subjective factor, of the correct policy of the Marxist-Leninist Party, grows immeasurably. Correctness of policy, resoluteness, the revolutionary preparedness and activity of the vanguard of the working class, fidelity to Leninist strategic and tactical principles are the first condition of the realisation of existing possibilities."

- ii) The struggle, in the Soviet view, between the 'socialist and capitalist' systems is a normal phase in interstate relations. It is part of the 'world revolutionary process' which demands centrally directed and co-ordinated activities at every point of contact between the Soviet bloc and its adversaries: military, diplomatic, economic, educational, scientific, artistic, medical, trade union, and so on. Whether overt or subversive, peaceful or warlike, each of these activities finds its appointed place under the Soviet concept of the 'correlation of forces'.
- iii) The 'correlation of forces' offers a guide to Soviet information policy and a framework for the assessment of the risks and cost-effectiveness of Soviet action abroad. For example, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was calculated to be risk-free because of Afghanistan's geographical position, her Marxist-Leninist regime, and the absence of defence links with any outside power or alliance. The validity of this calculation has been sustained by events to date. The gains in terms of military installations, such as roads and airports, outweigh the disadvantages in the form of a hostile international public opinion and casualties. Military superiority is important for a favourable "correlation of forces" and implies military and nuclear predominance. But in Soviet thinking the East-West relationship forms a single spectrum and its many shades range from unobtrusive persuasion to nuclear war.
- v) One such policy, to which Western societies are especially vulnerable, is ideological aggression. This is a tactic whereby the Soviet State and Party, aided by foreign Parties, fellow-travellers,

admirers and sympathisers in the West, exploit the various freedoms enshrined in democratic constitutions with such singleminded resolve over so long a period of time and on so extensive a scale that the cohesion, self-confidence and values of Western societies are undermined and their ability to resist Soviet intimidation, or even to be aware of its existence, is jeopardized. The intention, of course, is to achieve the fruits of war without the sacrifices of war.

- vi) Our internal vulnerability presents us with complex problems with which democratic societies, precisely because they are democratic societies, are ill-equipped to deal effectively under peacetime conditions. The question is whether these are peacetime conditions - whether the ideological war the Soviet Union has been waging against us for almost four decades with so much consistency still justifies the public belief that we live in a state of peace; and if it does not, whether there is some way in which democratic societies can, without betraying their essential character, mobilise the political will to respond to the whole spread of Soviet policies with adequate (even if not always symmetrical) policies of their own.

The most important aspect of this need is the ability of democratic society to counteract the effects of Soviet overt and covert propaganda by the education of public opinion. At a period when a new Soviet administration is placing over-riding priority on exploiting Western fears of nuclear armament, in an endeavour to win overwhelming superiority for its own forces, defence against this propaganda becomes a vital means of inducing the Soviet Union to negotiate genuinely. Urgent consideration should be given to the setting up of a department under the Prime Minister to this end.

V Soviet Reaction to Western Policy

- i) The Soviet Union regards any concession which it can make as a bargaining counter. It will not make it if no reward is forthcoming, nor if sanctions need not be anticipated should the concession be refused;
- ii) Ability to manipulate, or at any rate influence, Western public opinion by both overt and clandestine means is one of the most powerful weapons available to the USSR. The enlightenment and education of the public must therefore be regarded not only as a defensive measure for us, but as a positive one designed to influence the Soviet leaders to desist from reliance on propaganda and subversion, and to move them in the direction of putting their faith in genuine negotiations;
- iii) It follows from this that it is important that government and public institutions in this country must never accept at face value any mendacious Soviet claim about itself. Such occurrences as exchanges of delegations between Parliament and the Supreme Soviet, or between trade union organisations, or between churches, are apt to do harm because they enable the Soviet Union to claim that the Soviet is a parliament, and that its trade unions or churches are free;
- iv) It is important that the West should not get into the position where the Soviet Union is led to believe that we will take no action, especially economic action, against a Soviet aggressive move. Even if the prospect of doing anything positive is remote, we should always endeavour to keep the Soviet leaders guessing at our likely reaction to a move by them;

- vii) The challenge of having to live in a state of 'neither war nor peace' is a new one, peculiar to modern history. The survival of Western democracy may well turn on our ability to answer it.

IV The Present Position

- i) The Soviet Union has now entered a new period dominated by a new (though experienced) leadership which, if still elderly, is unlikely to change till the removal or death of Andropov. We see no reason to doubt that the revolutionary conquest of the world remains the main goal of Soviet government, and that something like the maximum extension of dominant influence is an intermediate aim. Though there is probably greater consensus in the Politburo on foreign policy than on any other aspect of policy, Mr Andropov's regime may emphasise subversion rather than renewed heavy investment in armaments. Soviet internal difficulties may be more skilfully masked under Andropov than in the past, though those will continue: bad agriculture; nationalist restlessness, particularly in the western republics; and shortages of consumer goods.
- ii) In order to consolidate itself, the new leadership in the Soviet Union will probably pursue even more vigorously declaratory and propaganda policies towards the West. It will be unlikely to respond to negotiations based on Western concessions by making significant Soviet counter-concessions, e.g. on arms control. But it will be anxious at least to be seen to be talking to the West in this period of uncertainty for them.

when it declined to a trickle - 3,000 in 1982. We believe that, just as the high level of emigration was motivated by hope of influencing US policy under President Carter through US Jewry, so the decline may have been brought about by conviction that no concessions could be won from President Reagan's administration. The greatest decline in 1982 may well have as its reason the realisation that the security of US grain supplies and of the pipeline deal no longer require circumspection from the USSR in a policy to which US opinion is sensitive.

VI The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Soviet Union

It is at this point that we should examine briefly the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union.

Strengths

- i) The unity of economic, international and military policies which the totalitarian system provides. There is no foundation for the view sometimes advanced that the military are in rivalry with the politicians. The evidence suggests that the armed forces now accept the lead of the CPSU without question, so long as they are allowed their prestige and materiel.
- ii) Effective control over public opinion so far as policy decisions are concerned. Examples of this are control which the Departments of the CPSU Central Committee, under the General Secretary, exercise over the interest groups which are allowed to lobby the organs of Central Government; or the immediate suppression of the rudiments of a genuine Soviet peace movement.

- v) Attempts at 'linkage', for example making the Soviet Union change its policy in return for a Western economic concession, are unlikely to succeed if they are overt. They make it possible for the Soviet leaders to appeal effectively in their domestic propaganda to natural patriotism and national pride. But economic linkage carried out secretly may be more effective.
- vi) The success with which the 'iron curtain' has been penetrated in recent years, and the effect which this has had on internal Soviet and East European opinion (for example, the emergence of a rudimentary free trade union movement, and peace movement) suggest that maximum attention should be paid to the expansion and improvement of broadcast and other propaganda to the peoples of the Soviet Union.
- vii) We should notice that there have been occasions when Western policy has been effective in preventing Soviet expansionism e.g. Persian Azerbaijan (1946); Yugoslavia (1948-9); Latin America (1962-8); Egypt (1970); the Middle East (1973); and perhaps Jamaica (1979); and in influencing Soviet internal policy over the Sakharov crisis (1973).
- viii) The Soviet Union may have been slow in dealing with the Middle East crisis (1973) for fear of Western reaction and also may have been similarly slow over reaction to the crisis and military conflict in Lebanon (1982), including her failure to support those in action to whom the Soviet Union had been giving the most vociferous support over the years. In this context, Soviet thinking may be illustrated by the policy adopted towards permitting emigration of Soviet Jews. This reached considerable proportions - up to 50,000 - in 1979, since

- iii) The fact that the Soviet Union operates against opponents who practice democracy makes both propaganda and subversion much easier. For example recruitment of agents of influence or economic espionage would not normally involve contravention of the law in this country;
- iv) The traditional Soviet ability to live with a good measure of muddle and chaos, while at the same time giving priority to military expansion - military pre-eminence may indeed be a factor in maintaining the slender legitimacy of the CPSU with a population which is susceptible to the growth of national prestige;
- v) The passivity of the Russian people, the absence of any democratic tradition, and the ease with which patriotism can be mobilised in support of autocracy despite gross oppression;
- vi) The size and potential wealth of the country, enabling the leadership to overcome waste and local disintegration.

Weaknesses

- i) Dependence on Western food and technology, which forces the Soviet Union to act circumspectly in pursuing its foreign policy;
- ii) The collapse of illusions about the Soviet system built up abroad with the aid of propaganda, communist parties, fellow-travellers of all kinds and the business community. This has resulted from better education in Soviet reality of Western public opinion, starting from

Khrushchev's "destalinisation", and more especially from the revelations of dissidents both inside and outside the country. It has also produced the exposure of the "Peace Movement" and the Moscow-controlled fronts, and the spread in some Western peace movements of the opinion that Warsaw Pact and not just NATO weapons should be reduced or scrapped. This view has appeared for example, in the DDR in church circles and in the Italian communist party;

- iii) The endemic diseases of communism - apathy, corruption, national discontent and intellectual dissent by workers, so far under control, could conceivably lead to a breakdown of the system, especially if they lead to greater pressure for reform from the middle ranks of the CPSU and army. The fact that Andropov, when head of the KGB, initiated a policy of forcing dissidents into exile, in spite of the harm which they cause to the Soviet image, illustrates the danger which they pose at home. Moreover, corruption is not so much an aberration as an essential element of the regime caused by economic inefficiency and by the ubiquitous method of control;
- iv) The Sino - Soviet conflict. The emergence of China, in the early 1960s, as a rival centre of Communist orthodoxy, and a threat to Soviet military and economic resources considerably undermined Soviet self-confidence. Since the US-Chinese and Sino-Japanese rapprochement, the Soviet fear of encirclement is grounded in fact. No other setback since the end of the second world war - not even the Soviet retreat in the 1962 Cuban Crisis - has had a comparable effect on Soviet morale at both the official and popular levels.

- v) (a) The state of health and social welfare in the Soviet Union. The infant mortality rate in the Soviet Union has increased, since 1971, by 36% to at least 31 per one thousand births (United Kingdom rate for 1981 was 11 per one thousand). About 10 million abortions are performed per annum - between 2 and 3 for every live birth. A typical Russian woman will have four abortions in her lifetime.
- (b) The life expectancy of Russian men has declined sharply. In 1969, the expected longevity of new-born Russian males was 66 years. Today it stands at 62. For Russian women, life-expectancy has levelled off at 74. (In the United Kingdom, average life expectancy for males is 70.2 years, for females 76.2 years). Death rates in the Soviet Union have also been climbing steadily from 6.9 deaths per one thousand people in 1964 to 10.3 in 1980.
- (c) Soviet health authorities still collect data on rickets. One study of deceased infants that was conducted in large Russian cities in the mid-1970s found that 37.1% had suffered from aggravated rickets (Vitamin D deficiency caused by lack of sunshine, lack of milk and other nutritives). Soviet medical authorities reported 385,000 cases of measles in 1979 as opposed to only 14,000 in the United States. Alcoholism is rampant among both Soviet men and women.
- vi) The demographic factor. The current balance (about 50:50) between the Russian and non-Russian populations is in the process of rapid erosion. Because of the population explosion in the Muslim parts of the country, it is estimated that by about the year 2000 almost 40% of Soviet national servicemen will be non-Slavs commanded in the Russian language by Slavic officers.

- vii) Though Soviet spending on armaments is larger than in any other nation, the "spin-off" for civilian purposes is modest.

VII A Western Response

- i) With all these issues and factors in mind, we consider that a coherently planned and effectively pursued policy towards the USSR would either:
- a) Persuade the Soviet leaders to reduce their expenditure on the military machine, and cause them to agree to a genuine policy of international arms limitation; which might involve conflict with the armed forces; or
- b) lead the Soviet leaders to persist in their inflated military expenditure at the expense of consumer demands, which would spark serious unrest. That could gather momentum and link up with, for example, nationalist discontent in a number of non-Russian republics. At the most hopeful level, this in turn could force the regime drastically to modify its policies.
- ii) This policy would require us to make more skilful uses of our economic, industrial and technological skills and superiority in the West. We should endeavour to develop a policy which will lead the Soviet Union to believe that so long as it pursues an aggressive policy, it risks losing the benefits of western economic support. To be effective, such a policy requires agreement and co-ordination between USA, Europe and Japan. The difficulty of achieving this is enormous, but we are convinced that in it lies the main hope of

influencing Soviet policy in a favourable direction from our point of view.

iii) We should also:-

- a) maintain, of course, our military strength and continue to invigorate our own UK and NATO effectiveness; at the same time stressing to the Soviet Union and the rest of the world that we are always ready to participate in serious and realistic talks about the control of arms such as those which led to the partial test ban treaty;
 - b) respond to the propaganda effort of the Soviet Union by intensifying our presentation of the United Kingdom/Western case on important issues diplomatically both abroad (e.g. in the UN or Helsinki follow-up meetings) and at home, in parliamentary statements and in our press, radio and television; consideration should be given to increasing BBC broadcasts to Russia and Eastern Europe; and
 - c) analyse and then consider possible ways of benefiting from existing and potentially growing differences between the Soviet Union and its East European allies, especially by increased selectivity in formulating our policies towards the latter which may also be of value to the West.
- iv) Some thought should also be given to the idea of showing more interest

in the affairs of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR, e.g. by making known the content of samizdat by publicity material in radio broadcasts. Broadcasting in their own languages to the half of the Soviet population whose mother tongue is not Russian should be reconsidered by Britain without clashing with Radio Liberty.

- v) Additional policies to be considered might include:
- a) The encouragement of 'democratic forces' in the Soviet Union. The Reagan initiative (now in its first planning stages) should be supported by a concerted West European effort.
 - b) The encouragement of free trade unionism in the USSR and, if possible through western trade unionists, the establishment to this end of a European (Trans-European) Trade Union 'Party' (Office, Centre) to keep the state of trade unionism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under constant review. The establishment of a 'Trade Union Radio' should be discussed, or assured institutional access to existing Western radios to serve above;
 - c) The establishment of a Council of Soviet Law might be considered to monitor and to publicise law-breaking by the Soviet authorities, including rights guaranteed under the Universal Convention of Human Rights, the Helsinki Accords, etc;
 - d) A West European propaganda posture with special emphasis on 'peace' and 'food' might be co-ordinated. Under 'peace' we want to make sure that the menace of nuclear destruction grips the Soviet and East European imagination as much as it has gripped ours. Under 'food'

we could run a protracted campaign (mainly via radios) to compare Soviet living standards with Western ones, shopping basket with shopping basket, housing with housing, health care with health care, unemployment pay (for example in Germany) with full employment pay in the USSR and so on;

- e) the wages of imperialism; a programme to show how the maintenance of the Soviet glacis in Eastern Europe and overseas expansionism cost Russian blood, treasure and living standards.

VIII CONCLUSION

Although assessment of opinion in the Soviet Union is a difficult matter, it seems reasonable to suppose that there still survive in the country at influential levels a few men and women to whom the official ideology and propaganda are repellent; and whose predominant motive for service is genuine patriotism. It is too soon to abandon all hope that these people will one day prevail over the 'apparatus men' whose influence is dominant today. Therefore, our propaganda, especially at government level, should be designed to stress that we have no enmity with the people of the USSR; that we recognise all genuine Soviet interests - and that the causes of enmity between our two countries are first of all the treatment which the Soviet regime imposes on such of its own subjects as seek to achieve a modicum of freedom and justice, and secondly the indefatigable, uncompromising, built-in aggression which we have tried to outline in our opening paragraphs, and which is inherent in an outmoded, irrelevant, discredited and dishonourable ideology.

