

WAGES NEED NO COUNCILS

Wages Councils Destroy Jobs

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Wages Councils

Destroy Jobs

Centre
for Policy
Studies

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WAGES NEED NO COUNCILS

INTRODUCTION

A government that has set its face against incomes policies in any form has left untouched one striking anomaly; the wages councils. These still regulate, though not with excessive zeal, the wages of nearly three million workers: about one worker in every eight.

The first of our wages councils appeared in 1909. They represent the first attempt in Britain in modern times to regulate wages by law, after three generations during which the laissez faire doctrine that wages were not the business of government universally prevailed. Worthy as the intentions of their originators undoubtedly were, wages councils have now outlived whatever usefulness they might have had; indeed, they have long been actively harmful to many of the defenceless poor they were meant to help and protect. Sharing the perverse quality of many regulative bodies, they provide classic examples of regulations with counter-productive effects.

The first wages councils (at that time called Trade Boards) came into being as a result of the initiative of Winston Churchill, who introduced the Trade Boards Act of 1909. The passing of the Act was the culmination of strong public feeling about sweated trades, which had been whipped up in a vigorous crusade: not, it should be pointed out, mainly by the left wing Radicals, but by philosophically minded people, including some of the most exalted rank. The National Anti-Sweating League was launched after an exhibition in the Albert Hall in May and June 1906 that was mainly intended for the middle and upper classes.

It exhibited the goods made by sweated labour and details were given of the wages paid for making them. Significantly the exhibition was a big feature of the London season and was opened by the Princess of Battenberg. One effect was to induce the headmasters of Eton and some other public schools to pay more for the racquets and balls those schools used so that the sweated workers who made them should have higher wages. This admirable attitude was, however, not typical of the superior folk behind the campaign. Most of them were anxious that the sweated workers should gain not at their expense, as customers, but at the expense of the employers.

Speaking on the Bill three years later, Winston Churchill justified it with the argument that the laws of supply and demand did not work in this particular labour market, because there was no parity in bargaining between capitalist employers and the unorganised workers - unorganised because they worked at home or in small workshops - so "the good employer is undercut by the bad and the bad is undercut by the worse" leading to "a condition of progressive degeneration". To put it in less high-flown language: the workers did not receive a living wage. The rationale of the wages councils thus sprang from the same paternalist argument about the weak bargaining power of the workers which, three years earlier, had led to the grant of legal immunities to unions for actions taken in furtherance of an industrial dispute (the Trades Disputes Act of 1906), which has since had such dire results. The argument popular at the time, and used by Churchill, usually identified the bad, unscrupulous employer with the small capitalist, who was ready to resort to harsher and pettier measures than the large employer. The stereotype is recognisable as the "cowboy" employer of today and was equally unfair. As the great Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall later summed it up: "Recent investigations have proved that this common opinion does injustice to a class of men, many of whom work hard for low gains and are by no means lacking in human sympathies."¹ This more balanced view

arose later, but at the time the Edwardian upper classes were obsessed with the "condition of England". The radical chic of that belle epoque had discovered poverty. The sight of it offended them, besides arousing feelings of guilt; and they were determined to do something about it - by passing laws to prohibit its more obnoxious symptoms.

So the 1909 Act was meant to combat the evils of sweating: low wages, long hours and unpleasant, unhealthy and unsafe working conditions. Its method was to provide the workers in the industries concerned with a substitute for the collective bargaining organisation they themselves either failed to generate or at least to generate on an adequate scale. It established a body for determining minimum wage rates and a system of enforcement. The underlying hope was that eventually the workers would be strong enough to bargain for themselves and that the official organisation could then stand down and let voluntary collective bargaining, which was assumed to be the norm and the ideal, take over. As the wages councils were extended in later years, there was increasing emphasis on the idea that they should act as a bridgehead for the establishment of trades unions in sufficient force to be able to act on their own. The wages councils could then cease to exist.

The original trades boards were thus set up, one for each industry, with equal numbers of employers' and workers' representatives and an odd number of independent members. This is the arrangement which we still have today. The formula was first applied to four trades in which sweated labour was mainly performed by home-workers. They were: ready-made and bespoke tailoring, paper and cardboard box making, chain-making and the finishing and mending of machine-made lace. The four trades employed around 400,000 workers, most of them women. The board could determine legal minimum wages, which in practice (that is after all the laid-down procedures including references to the minister were completed) took at least a year to come

¹Industry and Trade, London: Macmillan, 1920, p73.

into force. The experience of national wage settlements during the Great War created a climate of opinion favourable to the extension of the wages councils system. There was then another Trades Boards Act in 1918 in which the test for the need for their application in any industry became not primarily "exploitation" and sweating, but, quite explicitly, the lack of voluntary negotiations. At the same time procedures for applying minimum wages rates were speeded up. The result was a great expansion so that by the end of 1920 the boards covered 3 million workers, about 70 per cent of them women. The whole scheme for expansion was however dependent on the continuation of the post-war boom, which soon foundered, taking many of the trades boards with it. A new one was set up for farm labourers as a result of the Labour Government's Agricultural Wages Act of 1924, but it is administered quite separately and is not included among the other wages councils in the statistics. Expansion resumed in the more collectivist atmosphere of the thirties and boards were set up for road haulage, cutlery, baking, rubber manufacture and furniture-making.

The Second World War, like the First, might have been expected to make the wages councils more important; but they were overshadowed by the National Arbitration Tribunal, and trades with wages councils were not important to the war effort. The exception was Bevin's controversial Catering Wages Act of 1943. After the war, though, Bevin wanted to make wages councils the foundation of comprehensive system of industrial relations. To this end he brought in the Wages Councils Act of 1945 - the first time that the phrase "wages councils" as opposed to "trades boards" was used. His idea was to establish a system on which the ordinary worker in any industry could rely - even if the apparatus of collective bargaining under which he had previously sheltered were to collapse, as it had in a few industries during the depression of the thirties. The immediate effect of the Act was to introduce wages councils into the retail sector, on the grounds that voluntary negotiations were inadequate.

The long period of full employment after the fall of the first post-war Labour government meant that the *raison d'être* of the 1945 Act was, at any rate for the time being, removed. There seemed to be no need to have wages councils to act as a safety net in a depression if the depression never came. Wages councils reached their zenith in 1960, when there were 60 of them covering 3.5 million workers (excluding farm labourers).

Thereafter they declined, seventeen being abolished while others were merged;² but these were generally the smaller ones because, while the number of wages councils is down to 26, the number of workers under their care has only dropped to 2.7 million. Looking at the present list³ we find that most of them cover manufacturing industries in which there are large numbers of small employers, in which the proportion of women employees from ethnic minorities is high, and in which piece-work and home-work are prevalent. In numbers employed, though, workers in these industries are heavily outnumbered by those under the wing of wages councils in service industries such as catering, retailing, laundering, and hairdressing. Is there any need for these small manufacturers and providers of miscellaneous services to have all these bodies attempting to establish minimum wage rates and to foster trade union membership among those they employ?

Let us consider the case for wages councils as put forward by their main lobbyist, The Low Pay Unit (LPU), in a pamphlet: Who Needs the Wages Councils? (London 1983).

² See Appendix B.

³ See Appendix A.

1. EXPLOITATION

The original case for wages councils - that they protect the defenceless and poor wage earner against sweating - is, it is implied, still relevant: "The practice of 'sweating' meant that in certain labour-intensive industries employers were able to stockpile goods when labour was cheap and abundant and the product demand was low, then use those stockpiles to hold wages down during labour shortages. Workers in those industries were thus kept in a perpetually weak position and the extremely low rates of pay which resulted were unlimited by collective organisation."⁴

Yet stockpiling does not result in exploitation - except perhaps in the very short run - because it cuts both ways. Though the stockpile might be used to hold down wages when there is a shortage of labour, the building of the stockpile will raise demand when labour is abundant. This therefore has the effect of smoothing out the peaks and troughs in wages and employment which, from the point of view of most workers, would be advantageous:

As for the lack of union organisation resulting in the workers' weak bargaining power: this is Churchill's original argument. The idea that workers lose out because their contest with the capitalists is unequal appeals to the English desire for fair play. Yet again the argument is only considered in its opening stages and is not followed through. Trades unions can only increase the bargaining power of workers and thus raise their wages if they can limit the number of those seeking work, by restrictive practices like the closed shop or apprenticeship rules, or by restricting access to improved technology: either, like the original Luddites, by smashing machinery; or, like the print unions of the present, by preventing its use. The only way in which even the unions could

⁴ Who Needs the Wages Councils? London 1983, p 7.

restrict the number of out-workers would be by stopping them from offering their services. This might help those who are still allowed to work but it is of no use to those who are barred. Enforcing higher wages by law does indeed have somewhat the same effect as a powerful union: because it will reduce the amount of work which is profitable and therefore available, and this is most likely to hit the marginal or disadvantaged workers, like for instance the disabled.

The continuation of this exploitation case is that because the workers are unorganised "the employer is in a monopoly (or to be precise an oligopoly) position. He/she is able to pay a wage well below that commensurate with the workers' productivity."⁵ That is stated as if its truth were self-evident, but no evidence is produced that there is either monopoly or oligopoly among the employers. Indeed the fact that wages councils cover 400,000 establishments⁶ suggests that the typical situation of the employer in this whole sector is uncomfortably competitive.

At this point the LPU quotes a study of the effects of abolishing wages councils commissioned by the Department of Employment: "Market forces do not operate to ensure the elimination of low-paid employment areas as the combined effect of inadequate employment opportunities and social disadvantage serves to maintain supplies of low-paid labour."⁷ Indeed, market forces do not, in the short run, eliminate low paid employment, because they reflect the realities of low productivity. If in fact employers were paying workers much less than their

⁵ Who Needs the Wages Councils? London 1983, p 10

⁶ Hansard 28 March 1983, col.53-56

⁷ C. Craig et al. Labour Market Structure, Industrial Organisation and Low Pay, Cambridge 1982.

productivity made them worth, they would be making large profits. But there is ample evidence that, as Alfred Marshall said in the 1920s, the employers are on the contrary in many cases struggling to survive.

Employment even at very low rates of pay can be very welcome to people with few economic opportunities. For instance, in the heyday of the sweatshops of New York's lower east side in the late nineteenth century, the long hours of Jewish workers toiling in their homes at sewing machines etc, "were hardly necessary to keep body and soul together, despite their low pay, 'more than half of which goes into the bank'." Although then as now there were cries of "exploitation", they and indeed the sweatshop owners who made low profits were "making the most of such limited options as they had given the technology, skill and wealth at their disposal."⁸

Sowell concludes: "In view of the later economic progress of the Jews, it is by no means clear that their understanding of the situation was not at least as good as that of the reformers who had tried vainly to stop them from doing what they felt they had to do." Our twentieth century "reformers" have been rather more successful than their predecessors a century ago in establishing minimum wage rates, which have had a particularly bad effect on youth employment, though with the usually sincere intention of protecting the young from exploitation. This was partly through wages councils and partly through trades union restrictions. A figure often quoted is that minimum wages for youths in this country are 60 per cent of the adult rate, whereas in West Germany and Japan they are only 20 per cent.⁹ Those countries have no problem of unemployment specifically affecting youth; we have.

The contribution to this unhappy result from the wages councils is less well-known. According to Mr. Eric Cockeram MP, speaking in a debate on low pay in the Commons, in 1945 at the

⁸ Thomas Sowell: Markets and Minorities, Oxford 1981, p111

⁹ NIESR August 1983; Hansard, 15 February 1984, col.314

end of the war wages council rates for the young in Britain were fixed at about 38 per cent of the adult wages they also set. Today, however, the wages councils' starting rate for school-leavers is 62 per cent of adult wages.¹⁰ Numerous examples were quoted in the debate of how minimum wage rates for youths were reducing their chances of obtaining jobs. Mr. Cockeram himself referred to farmers in his constituency constantly finding that, with wage costs as high as they were, it paid them to mechanise rather than take on school-leavers. He also said that two large firms in his constituency had closed down their apprenticeship training schemes because they couldn't afford to run them at current wage rates.

In the same debate Mr. Edward Leigh MP gave an example of a constituent who, last summer, wanted to employ six young people to work on his camping site. He offered them £45 a week which they were happy to accept. A visiting inspector said, however, that he must pay them each ten pounds more per week. In the end he kept only three.¹¹

Here are some further examples furnished by Teresa Gorman in articles in the Daily Telegraph:

During the summer of 1983 "a holiday park in Clacton took on half a dozen untrained teenagers at £45 a week. The work was not demanding and the teenagers were learning to fit into the workaday world. But it was not to last. An inspector from the wages council - and there are five wages councils which apply to the holiday industry - prosecuted the employer for 'paying below the statutory minimum of £54 a week. The employer then cut down on the number of people he employed." (Daily Telegraph 21/10/83)

¹⁰ Hansard 15 February 1984, cols. 290 and 291

¹¹ Ibid. col. 315

"A hotelier in the South of England hired a school-leaver to help in the kitchen and live in. At this time the boy who was not too bright weighed eight stone and had an unhappy personal history. But he settled down happily as part of the hotel manager's family, ate enough for four and at the age of eighteen had filled out to fourteen stone. His contentment was destroyed by a wage inspector on a routine investigation who announced that since he had passed his eighteenth birthday he was entitled to adult rates of pay. This meant an increase of £13 a week from £49 to £62. He was not the only junior employee affected and since the employer could not conjure up the extra money he was forced to reduce his staff..." (Daily Telegraph 15/12/81)

Again "a wages inspector descended on a Hertfordshire baker, informed the youngsters of their statutory rights to higher pay and holidays, poisoned the working atmosphere and led to the employer giving them the sack.

A bookseller in the West Country employing three people was forced to sack one, the youngest, on a last-in, first-out basis when ordered by the wages council to increase wages by 24 per cent." (Daily Telegraph 27/7/81)

But if this evidence seems too anecdotal, consider the macroeconomic report for the Department of Employment of December 19 1983. According to this, if the earnings of youths under 18 increase by 1 per cent relative to adult men, male youth unemployment rises by 2 per cent. According to research by Mr Bill Wells, until about 1969 there was a shortage of young workers and afterwards a surplus, but in both periods the relative pay of young workers did not respond to the movement of supply and demand. The failure to decrease the wages of the young relative to those of adults, as the supply of labour outstripped demand after 1969, helped to cause the increase in youth unemployment. In rendering the wages of young people so rigid the wages councils certainly played their part.

2. THE LIVING WAGE

The original object of the wages councils was to ensure that in the industries to which they applied the workers had at least a living wage. But what is a living wage? Some of the definitions are absurd. For instance, the National Board for Prices and Incomes and the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Wealth defined it as the lowest 10 per cent of the wages of male manual workers, which in 1983-4 was £91.30 per week. The TUC's low pay target was two thirds of average male manual earnings, or £95.73; the Council of Europe laid down a "decency threshold" for wages equivalent to 68 per cent of average adult earnings - that would now yield a figure of £101.25. Yet it is ridiculous to talk of low pay merely as a percentage of the average. On that basis, if everybody were a hundred times better off, the problem would be as intractable as ever. It removes the idea of a living wage from the area of poverty and want and reduces it to the trivial tragedy of not being able to keep up with the Joneses. To say on the basis of the Council of Europe's definition that a third of the British workforce, seven million all told, are below the decency level, is to distort the ordinary meaning of words like "decency".

If for practical purposes we define the poor as those who qualify for supplementary benefit, the case for trying to eliminate or alleviate poverty through minimum wage legislation goes up in smoke. For there is a very small overlap between those who are poor and those who are on low wages. This is still true even if the definition of poverty is jacked up to 140 per cent of the maximum level qualifying for supplementary benefit, as Richard Layard did in a background paper for the Royal Commission on Distribution of Wealth. Most of those on low rates of pay per hour are either single people with few dependents or married women. Families with working wives are not usually poor, because they have two wage packets coming into

the home. Richard Layard's study shows that only one in five of those in the poorest families (he means the bottom 10 per cent) are among the lowest paid, so a minimum wage which hoisted the remuneration of the low paid very considerably would leave most poor families untouched.

Look at it another way. According to the LPU in 1979, more than two million people were living in families whose income was below the family benefit level; nearly one in four of these were in families where the breadwinner was employed full-time. That means that 500,000 people are in the target area of poor people whose conditions could be affected by wage regulation. If the average family of this type consisted of three people then the full-time wage-earners subject to wage council controls would number 166,667. Even if, as is unlikely in view of the above, all of these were in the low pay category, it would be a dissipation of effort to have a system of wages councils covering 2.7 million to reduce the poverty of less than a sixteenth of that number. Plainly, as a mechanism for dealing with the poverty problem, wages councils are very inefficient. The welfare state which has grown up since wages councils first began is also imperfect, but not as imperfect as that.

It is argued that dealing with poverty through supplementary benefit payments and without minimum wage arrangements is to institutionalise the poverty trap and that topping up low wages with supplementary benefit payments subsidises the employers of low wage labour. But the poverty trap reaches far wider than the small numbers involved in it who are employed in industries with wages councils.

In essence the poverty trap (the impossibility for certain groups of poor people to improve their net income unless their gross income makes a big leap) results from the combination of means-tested benefits with high marginal taxation of income, so that as gross income rises the benefits fall away while the taxes

rise sharply. Benefits are often only needed because of high personal taxation. As Hermione Parker puts it in her pathbreaking The Moral Hazard of Social Benefits:¹³ "The DHSS figures show that in almost every case means-tested benefits payable to employed people are necessary only because gross earnings have been whittled away by income tax, national insurance contribution and local authority rates." The real cure for this is to lower and ultimately abolish the marginal rates for the low paid, as the present Chancellor of the Exchequer is in the process of doing.

Benefits are indeed subsidies to the recipients, but it does not follow that they are subsidies to the employers. If the workers concerned have low productivity and have correspondingly low wages, then the employer receives no subsidy. If the worker were prevented from working at that low wage and so lived entirely on benefit, society would lose the product of this work.

¹³ IEA, London 1982

3. FAIR WAGES AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

The LPU contends that low wages encourage firms to go on being inefficient, and that higher wages encourage them to be more efficient: for instance by investing in improved techniques.

But economic efficiency means producing whatever goods or services are required at the lowest cost and this requires the businessman concerned to find the least costly mix of factors of production - labour, capital, skill and enterprise - to do the job. If the effect of raising wage costs is to encourage the businessman to use more capital equipment as a substitute for labour, the result might be more output per worker but at the expense of employing fewer workers, while costs per unit of output may be higher and these, by reducing the unit profit, will tend to reduce overall sales, which in turn will diminish the number of employees.

The Cambridge study already quoted suggests that there is another kind of inefficiency promoted by low wages: "Unregulated low wage employment destabilises product markets, increases uncertainty and risk, slows down the rate of scrapping of outdated equipment and consequently reduces both the level of new investment and the profitability of new investment in high wage firms." This bears a remarkable resemblance to the kinds of arguments put up by interested parties against the repeal of Resale Price Maintenance. Yet its abolition did not result in disorderly marketing. It is the big firms which want the enforcement of their own wage levels so that they are protected against competition from smaller firms. The latter may pay lower wages though not lower than the market dictates; but if forced to pay higher wages they would end by not paying anybody. To make things worse, it is larger rather than smaller firms which tend to be represented on the wages councils.

4. BRITAIN'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

In order to abolish wages councils Britain must first drop out of the Convention of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which it cannot do until June 1986.¹⁴ A year's notice must be given, so the decision about whether to renounce the Convention must be taken by June 1985. To abolish wage councils would also, says the LPU, contravene the European Social Charter administered under the Council of Europe; but this is untrue because the Council has never accepted the advisory committee's recommendations to commit itself to the 68% minimum wage. The main argument then is about whether we should quit the ILO Convention. The case against is that to do so would be to undermine virtuous conspiracy among the 94 signatory nations to eliminate "unfair competition" by firms employing low wage labour. This is a revival of an old protectionist fallacy that one should keep out the products of cheap labour. It poses as a humanitarian viewpoint and implies sympathy with the underdog; but it is actually the reverse. The best way to help the poorly paid workers is not to deny them a livelihood, but to buy what they produce.¹⁵

There is thus no justification for wages councils in a free society, but that does not mean that they will disappear without a struggle. All controls and the quango bodies set up to administer them are loved by the interests they protect; and the wages councils are no exception. The large employers are frequently more attached to them than the unions. As Professor H A Clegg put it:¹⁶ "In most instances in which the abolition of a council has been under discussion the employers have been

¹⁴ House of Commons, answer by Mr. Townend, November 23 1983.

¹⁵ The Agricultural Wages Board, which has had an especially pernicious effect, falls under a different Convention, ILO Convention 99; the British Government has an opportunity to give notice of renunciation already in August 1984. To seize this chance would represent a first step towards abolition of wages councils in general.

more reluctant than the unions. This is because they feared that without legal enforcement of the rates of pay and hours of work some of the smaller firms might resort to undercutting in both wages and prices and their organisation would not be able to put a stop to it. The unions with their membership concentrated in the large firms were confident that they could ensure that voluntary agreements would be followed there and were less concerned about the small fry."¹⁶

The wages councils give unions status and representation which in most cases they would otherwise not have because their membership includes only a small proportion of the workers. The Royal Commission put union membership at 4 per cent of the labour force in the catering industry, for example. Yet at various times in the twenties and again in the sixties and early seventies, many union officials felt that wages councils made the unions look unnecessary. Some suspected that wages councils were becoming barriers to trades union growth. However, the union chieftains do have a preference for controls, especially if administered by a Labour government which they themselves control. The wages councils provide a framework which could be expanded on Bevin's intended lines to provide a national industrial relations system; and they are a means of enforcing the national minimum wage on which the TUC has set its heart. Needless to say, any such national across the board minimum would extend more widely the damage already done by minimum wages in the wages councils' industries.

Another major interest group is the poverty lobby, in particular the Low Pay Unit which has been running a campaign to save the wages councils. The poverty lobby has not only provided the backup for Opposition spokesmen on social affairs but has virtually taken them over. In BBC "File on 4" on 29 November 1983, Labour's social services spokesman Geoff Rooker

¹⁶ The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Oxford 1972, p 358.

said: "I would not have been able to operate effectively unless I knew that I could have called on the resources of these organisations. For instance, they would actually send people down to the public hearings of the Committee stage of a Bill in case things were said by ministers which may be contradictory to the programme and notes could be handed across although the rules don't normally allow that." On social affairs the poverty lobby has become in effect the Opposition's shadow civil service.

CONCLUSIONS

The wages councils do much for the self-esteem of the quangurus who sit on them. At the same time they do real harm to those poor and economically weak sections of the community (including young people, women, ethnic minorities and the disabled) whose productivity is often low, and who are priced out of employment by the minimum rates of pay laid down by wages councils.

The intentions of their Edwardian creators did them more credit than their analysis. Though they have done more harm than good, they have been kept in existence by the large firms, which seek to impose their wage levels on their smaller competitors; and by the trades unions, which see wages councils in the short term as brakes on low wage competition for their members and in the long term as recruiting agents in industries where their organisation is weak. Yet the original justification for wages councils, feeble as it was, that they were a way to alleviate poverty, has now disappeared with the luxurious growth in the meantime of the alternative approach of the welfare state. The latter, for all its many faults, is vastly better equipped to deal with the poverty problem than any form of wage control could ever be.

What then should be done with them? Two years ago the National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses produced a booklet called Priced Out, which demonstrated the unhappy effect of wages councils on jobs. It said: "The wages councils should lose their statutory powers and privileges. The legal enforcement of minimum wages should be removed; the central government secretariat should be disbanded and the inspectorate should be discontinued. The Secretary of State has the power to convert wages councils into Statutory Joint Industrial Councils without enforcement powers and this would be a useful first step." It would indeed, as long as this does not delay the last step: abolition.

APPENDIX A

List of Wages Councils

Aerated Waters (England and Wales)
Aerated Waters (Scotland)
Boot and Shoe Repairing
Button Manufacturing
Coffin Furniture and Cerement Making
Corset
Cotton Waste Reclamation
Dressmaking and Women's Light Clothing (England and Wales)
Dressmaking and Women's Light Clothing (Scotland)
Flax and Hemp
Fur
General Waste Material Reclamation
Hairdressing Undertakings
Hat, Cap and Millinery
Lace Finishing
Laundry
Licensed Non-residential Establishment
Licensed Residential Establishment and Licensed Restaurant
Linen and Cotton Handkerchief and Household Goods and Linen Piece Goods
Made-up Textiles
Ostrich and Fancy Feather and Artificial Flower
Perambulator and Invalid Carriage
Pin, Hook and Eye and Snap Fastener
Ready-made and Wholesale Bespoke Tailoring
Retail Bespoke Tailoring
Retail Food and Allied Trades
Retail Trades (Non-food)
Rope, Twine and Net
Rubber Proofed Garment Making Industry
Sack and Bag
Shirtmaking
Toy Manufacturing
Unlicensed Place of Refreshment
Wholesale Mantle and Costume.

APPENDIX B

WAGES COUNCIL/TRADE BOARD	DATE ESTABLISHED	DATE ABOLISHED
Furniture Manufacturing (GB)	5.3.1940	16.4.1947
Tobacco (GB)	24.1.1919	1.7.1953
Rubber Reclamation (GB)	21.9.1938	4.4.1955
Chain (GB)	25.11.1909	11.9.1956
Rubber Manufacturing (GB)	21.9.1938	27.8.1958
Drift Nets Mending (GB)	11.7. 1910	31.3.1960
Fustian Cutting (GB)	31.5.1933	27.6.1960
Tin Box (GB)	12.6.1914	30.11.1960
Hat, Cap and Millinery (England and Wales)	20.11.1919	1.3.1963 ¹
Hat, Cap and Millinery (Scotland)	31.3.1920	1.3.1963 ²
Baking (Scotland)	20.5.1938	1.10.1963
Sugar, Confectionary and Food Preserving (GB)	23.12.1913	1.10.1963
Cutlery (GB)	28.9.1933	15.7.1969
Jute (GB)	8.12.1919	27.10.1969
Paper Bag (GB)	25.12.1919	27.10.1969
Baking (England and Wales)	20.5.1938	2.5.1971
Boot and Floor Polish (GB)	11.7.1921	13.5.1974
Brush and Broom (GB)	9.5.1919	21.6.1974
Hair, Bass and Fibre (GB)	20.2.1920	21.6.1974
Stamped or Pressed Metal-wares (GB)	6.7.1914	1.4.1975
Keg and Drum (GB)	26.10.1928	1.6.1975
Paper Box (GB)	18.10.1916	1.6.1975
Milk Distributive (England and Wales)	27.2.1920	29.12.1975
Industrial and Staff Canteen Undertakings (GB)	13.3.1944	28.6.1976
Milk Distributive (Scotland)	16.8.1920	6.9.1976
Retail Bespoke Tailoring (England and Wales)	3.9.1919	1.12.1977 ²
Road Haulage (GB)	2.1.1939	6.9.1978

WAGES COUNCIL/TRADE BOARD	DATE ESTABLISHED	DATE ABOLISHED
Retail Bespoke Tailoring (Scotland)	3.9.1919	1.12.1977 ²
Corset	6.5.1919	1.9.1979 ³
Dressmaking & Women's Light Clothing (England & Wales)	24.11.1919	1.9.1979 ³
Dressmaking & Women's Light Clothing (Scotland)	29.3.1920	1.9.1979 ³
Ready-Made & Wholesale Bespoke Tailoring (GB)	15.1.1920	1.9.1979 ³
Rubber Proofed Garment Making Industry (GB)	15.10.1956	1.9.1979 ³
Shirtmaking (GB)	26.12.1913	1.9.1979 ³
Wholesale Mantle & Costume (GB)	3.9.1919	1.9.1979 ³
Retail Bread & Flour Confectionery (Eng & Wales)	9.4.1953	1.8.1979 ⁴
Retail Bread & Flour Confectionery (Scotland)	9.4.1953	1.9.1979 ⁴
Retail Food Trades (Eng & Wales)	15.8.1947	1.9.1979 ⁴
Retail Food Trades (Scotland)	30.3.1948	1.9.1979 ⁴
Retail Newsagency, Tobacco & Confectionery (Eng & Wales)	15.8.1947	1.9.1979 ⁴
Retail Newsagency, Tobacco & Confectionery (Scotland)	29.10.1947	1.9.1979 ⁴
Retail Bookselling & Stationery Trades (GB)	29.10.1947	1.9.1979 ⁵
Retail Drapery, Outfitting & Footware Trades (GB)	30.3.1948	1.9.1979 ⁵
Pin, Hook & Eye, Snap Fastener (GB)	17.2.1920	18.11.1980
Aerated Waters (Eng and Wales)	1.1.1920	14.2.1983 ⁶
Aerated Waters (Scotland)	8.1.1920	14.2.1983 ⁶

Notes

- 1, 2 & 6: Councils for England and Wales, and Scotland amalgamated into one for Great Britain
3. Councils amalgamated to form Clothing Manufacturing (GB)
4. Councils amalgamated to form retail Food & allied Trades (GB)
5. Councils amalgamated to form Retail Trades (Non-Food) (GB)