



POLICY CHALLENGE

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Making Unionism Positive

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C O N T E N T S

	Page
1. Introduction	4
2. The problem in perspective Nationalism and devolution: a case of unsuccessful appeasement The Conservative response since 1979	5
3. The new Conservative agenda for Scotland	10
4. Conclusion	17
5. Appendices	18

1. Introduction

The last General Election produced one of the worst results ever for the Conservative Party in Scotland. Fresh thought has now been given to the Party's whole political strategy north of the border.

The purpose of this paper is to make a measured contribution to the discussions which are now taking place.

The authors' analysis is based on three main assumptions:

i) the Conservative decline in Scotland is a long term phenomenon which has merely continued under the present Government;

ii) it is the ambivalence of the Conservative Party (the Conservative and Unionist Party to give it its full, proper title) towards its own Unionist philosophy in relation to Scottish affairs which lies behind this decline; and

iii) the survival of the Conservative Party in Scotland as an effective political force must be seen not simply as a matter of parliamentary arithmetic but in the wider context of the survival of the Unionist philosophy and even of the Union itself.

The problem in perspective

The scale of the Conservative setback in Scotland has tempted some to characterise the 1987 result as an aberration which requires special explanation. Hence it has become widely accepted in Scotland that the 'Thatcher Factor' was to blame for the magnitude of the Party's defeat. And this view is even shared by many of the Party's supporters.

This explanation completely misses the real significance of the 1987 result -- that is, that it conforms closely to the history of almost uninterrupted decline in the Party's fortunes in Scotland over the past 30 years (see Appendices 1 & 2): one which has been independent of policy, leader, and indeed of tenure of office.

In any case Thatcherism has not, hitherto, been implemented nearly to the same extent in Scotland as it has been in the rest of Great Britain. Far from suffering from a surfeit of Thatcherism, Scotland has yet to feel its full benefits. Part of the problem has been the existence in Scotland of a well-developed political and administrative structure which has proved extremely resistant to change.

In 1979 the established arrangements still appeared capable of working to the advantage of Scotland and the Conservative Party. But increasingly the experience of Conservative Government in Scotland showed that the traditional structures were working more and more to the benefit of the Opposition Parties, despite the latter's failure to develop the policies needed to secure the long-term stability and success of the Union.

At a time when the political agenda was changing radically elsewhere, the terms of the political debate in Scotland still tended to revolve around the level of public finance, State interventionism and devolution. The effect has been to make the Conservatives look defensive and apologetic. As a result Scotland has more and more come to be regarded as separate, different and of marginal significance. A very high price has been paid for fighting on ground where the Opposition finds it easy to conduct the argument in terms of its own choice.

Regaining control of the political agenda must be the first step towards the recovery of Conservative fortunes. This requires that it be seen to campaign actively against legislative devolution, and for the Union. Such a stance should also involve reconsidering the nature of the administrative devolution that has been accorded to Scotland.

This would lay the foundations for:

- i) putting forward a coherent and distinctive Conservative policy in Scotland;
- ii) integrating more successfully the Government's policies

in Scotland with what are regarded as the main elements of modern Conservatism; and

- iii) countering the widespread feeling that Scotland has been marginalised and returning Scottish policies to the mainstream.

We believe that the proposals contained in this paper will not only make possible the revival of the Conservative Party in Scotland, but will also -- more importantly -- secure the long-term interests of Scotland and the Union. They will change the manner in which political debate is conducted, restore the initiative to the Conservative Party and make Unionism -- not devolution -- the issue around which Scottish politics revolve.

Nationalism and devolution: a case of unsuccessful appeasement

To understand the decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland it is necessary to understand the rise of nationalism as a political force.

Scottish Home Rulers existed many years before the SNP was formed in 1928. The momentum, created over a considerable period, was to take the SNP to nearly one-third of the vote in Scotland by October 1974 -- and unleash anti-Unionist sentiment which other Parties has sought to turn to their advantage.

This upsurge in nationalist sentiment had a number of causes.

First, it was encouraged by the expansion of the Scottish Office and the 'Home Rule' consensus prevalent up to the 1970s (though that consensus was intended to have the opposite effect and, indeed, kill off the nationalist threat in political terms).

The Scottish Office was established in 1885 and functions were devolved to it in a haphazard and piecemeal fashion -- at various points over the next hundred years -- without any proper consideration of the merits (and demerits) of transferring them to Scotland rather than keeping them on a UK basis.

The result was that by 1970 34 major functions had been devolved to the Scottish Office from Whitehall, but no one can explain convincingly, or even satisfactorily, the principles on which this substantial administrative devolution was based, or why the Scottish Office should carry out so many different functions. Certainly devolution cannot be explained as a sensible and logical exercise designed to separate the purely Scottish elements from more general British concerns. The National Health Service in Scotland, for example, is no more Scottish in its essential features than the social security system: but the former is the responsibility of the Scottish Office while the latter is administered by the Department of Health and Social Security in London. Again roads in Scotland do not have some peculiarly Scottish characteristics which rail lacks: yet the Scottish Office deals with the first but not the second (which comes under the Department of Transport in Whitehall).

The impression gained ground that the Scottish

Office could secure virtually any power that it wanted from Whitehall if it asked for it with sufficient determination and no one in London objected (see Appendix 3 for details of the existing division of responsibilities). Can it have been mere coincidence that over the same period -- slowly at first -- there was an increasingly vocal Scottish nationalism which seemed to feed on this growing autonomy?

Second, the Conservative Party itself embraced this haphazard administrative devolution. After the war, it came to be seen as the most effective means of combating the moves of the Attlee Government towards increasing State control. Such developments gave groups in Scotland a vested interest in organising themselves as a 'Scottish lobby'. This was especially true in the business sphere. For example, the decision to group all businesses in Scotland as a single economic unit for planning purposes had the effect of providing them with a new self-image as 'Scottish business' fighting Westminster on behalf of supposed Scottish interests.

This situation continues today with a multitude of Scottish pressure groups and quangos which have an entrenched interest in emphasising and perpetuating the differences between Scotland and the rest of Britain. The manner in which public finance is now allocated to Scotland has confirmed and strengthened this division which inflicts great damage on the country as a whole.

Third, nationalism ironically received its greatest fillip from the very policy designed to combat it -- the proposal to create a Scottish Assembly. The Conservatives' flirtation with this policy reached its peak with Edward Heath's 'Declaration of Perth' in 1968.

This devolutionist phase of Conservative policy both encouraged the Nationalists and caused the voters to lose faith in the Unionist philosophy since Tories no longer appeared to espouse it with much enthusiasm. It is little wonder that the Conservatives gained small credit at the polls when their support for devolution seemed the most opportunistic and least committed of all the Parties. In short, the Party lost the one distinct appeal that it had -- its unequivocal Unionism -- and acquired no new convincing policy to put in its place.

The Conservative response since 1979

The Conservative Party has to recognise that since 1979 it has adopted a different approach to a whole range of issues in Scotland from that in Britain as a whole, giving rise to confusion and perplexity.

The 1987 Election has made the Party in Scotland much more conscious of the apparent contradictions between the actions taken by Whitehall and by the Scottish Office which have contributed to the Conservatives' problems in Scotland.

The Prime Minister and her Cabinet generally have become clearly identified with specific values -- individualism,

ownership, prudent finance and 'less government'. They have created a positive Conservatism for England and Wales -- but so far that has not been complemented in Scotland by a positive Unionism: one which is able to put the essence of modern Conservatism into an idiom that helps build up the unity and strength of Great Britain.

Conscious of the need to find a substitute for a policy on devolution, the Scottish Tories have -- for quite understandable reasons -- tended to highlight the differences in policy towards Scotland, pointing out in particular Scotland's relatively advantageous position in public spending terms. And this inevitably helped the Opposition to continue to focus discussion on issues from which it stands to gain.

This is a line which can be seen -- with the benefit of hindsight -- to have backfired in several ways:

i) Public Spending and Alienation. By making a virtue out of the higher public expenditure figures in Scotland, the desirability of increased public spending as an end in itself has been reinforced in the mind of the electorate. This has made current policy for Britain as a whole seem more alien, as well as entrenching Socialist and Nationalist principles in the minds of the voters. It has also reinforced the idea -- which runs counter to Unionism -- that Scotland should receive funding based on being Scottish rather than on specifically identifiable needs.

Since 1978, indeed, public spending in Scotland has been allocated on that basis. In this absolutely crucial area Scotland is treated as if it did have a devolved assembly. The formula used to determine public spending was adopted by the Labour Government on the assumption that an assembly would be set up. What is more the formula was based on actual spending in the late 1970s when Scotland was treated with particular generosity. So the formula locks in the high provision conceded under Labour. It has helped bring to Scotland levels of public spending which are consistently higher than those in England -- 28 per cent higher in the last financial year per capita.

This state of affairs assists Scottish nationalism (which the Labour Party is now attempting to exploit) -- not Unionism -- and has propagated the deeply damaging idea that even Conservative Secretaries of State have to battle against the 'English Treasury' to keep funding for Scotland at high levels. This injects an almost colonial note into Scottish politics, which is wholly inappropriate for a full and equal partner in the Constitutional Union. And it stirs up resentment against Scotland in other regions -- particularly the North East -- which suffer from similar problems, but which are less handsomely treated by the public purse. Unionism must mean proper equality -- both as regards obligations and benefits.

We believe that the concept of funding for nationhood and not needs should disappear, and that public spending should be directed specifically to where it can be most

efficiently used, no matter where the border happens to come on the map.

ii) Marginalisation. The net effect of the Conservative Party's attempts to defuse Scottish nationalism as a political force has been, ironically, to foster the impression of Scotland operating on the periphery. Indeed, feelings of neglect and remoteness were most often cited by voters as reasons for turning against the Government in 1987.

This is hardly surprising, since in many respects Scotland has been taken out of the mainstream and marginalised. The price that Scotland pays for having its own set of Ministers administering distinctive policies, is that the national issues which are debated and portrayed on the national news media by nationally known figures seem to ignore Scotland. It is small wonder that the Secretary of State for Education or Health is accused of paying little attention to Scotland when to a large degree he is not responsible for what goes on there.

iii) Government Overload. We believe that all these factors contributed to the poor Conservative showing in the 1987 Election in Scotland. The result, however, brought new difficulties and accentuated a number of existing problems in the running of the Scottish Office. No other Government Department, for example, would be asked to limit its choice to ten men.

This numerical shortage means that:

- a) Scottish Office Ministers have so many Departmental responsibilities that they are bound to find it difficult to attend fully to them or to think creatively;
- b) they lack a specific identity in the eyes of the public -- they are expected to be 'Jacks of all trades';
- c) too few backbenchers are left to take the Tory message to the constituencies.

The people of Scotland might be forgiven for thinking that, far from benefiting from the powers devolved to the Scottish Office, they are receiving second-rate Government as a result of the excessive pressures on Scottish Ministers.

Ultimately, the prime consideration for the Conservatives must be to provide good government for Scotland -- based on firm principles, (particularly when it comes to the devolved powers), which can be readily understood.

The new Conservative agenda for Scotland

The Party has two choices:

it can seek to identify itself more closely with exclusively Scottish issues, particularly where these take the form of grievances against England or the Government

OR

it can develop policies designed to combine the specifically Scottish elements with the wider British dimension in a new dynamic partnership, giving the Tory Party in Scotland a standing and sense of purpose that it has never had before.

The first option would turn Scottish Conservatives into critics of some of the actions of their own Government, or make them appear as 'protectors' of Scotland against 'Thatcherism'. To some extent that has already happened -- with, we believe, immensely damaging consequences. It is a ludicrous position for the Scottish Party to adopt -- and, in addition, condemns it to continue fighting the political battle in Scotland on grounds of its opponents' choosing.

We recommend that this option be decisively rejected.

The second option, by contrast, supplies a highly constructive approach, and a clear, resolute Unionist posture. It needs to be based on a firm, guiding principle. That was provided by the great constitutionalist, A V Dicey, writing in 1920:

The parliamentary union of the kingdoms, both theoretically and in fact, was a very different thing from the subjection of Scotland to England. It was, as its very name proclaimed, a treaty whereby England and Scotland alike became members of the State of Great Britain, wherein no doubt England, to use a modern expression, was the predominant partner. But partnership made on fair terms is an essentially different thing from subjection or servitude.

The terms on which the Union exists today need to be reconsidered partly because they are not sufficiently fair to both countries, but also for the other reasons we have given. The task of modernising and improving the Union can only be undertaken by a Party which is committed wholeheartedly to it. And by reaffirming its Unionism, the Conservatives can expect to recover the ground they have lost. It was after all as the Unionist Party (the title which it used in Scotland up to 1965) that it enjoyed its greatest electoral successes in the period from 1886 onwards which culminated in its spectacular victories in the 1950s.

A policy designed to implement a new, 'positive Unionism', should have four key features:

- i) firm rejection of legislative devolution;
- ii) a fundamental re-examination of the existing system of administrative devolution which has developed so haphazardly in Scotland;
- iii) a display of sensitivity -- indeed empathy -- towards Scottish traditions and culture;
- iv) the assimilation of Scotland, sensibly and pragmatically, within the overall framework of Conservative policies, making proper allowance within it for the distinctive characteristics of Scottish life.

i) Rejection of legislative Devolution

The Party of 'positive Unionism' cannot also be the Party of legislative devolution. The principles which would be embodied in the former are simply incompatible with the principles on which a system of legislative devolution would be established.

Yet, for too long, on the central issue of devolution, it vacillated between two options: neither rejecting, nor embracing, either with any very significant degree of fervour, consistency or conviction.

The Party suffered gravely as a result of this irresolution. Its Unionism, which ought to be the foundation of Scottish Conservatism, acquired a defensive, even apologetic, air. That inspires no one. On the other hand, the case against legislative devolution has rarely been argued with real intellectual or political force -- though Mr Rifkind's recent speeches suggest strongly that at last the challenge is being answered.

By and large, however, the Party in Scotland has been having the worst of both worlds. It has not equipped itself with a 'positive Unionism' capable of evoking enthusiasm and interest amongst the electorate. At the same time, the absence of 'positive Unionism' creates the suspicion -- reinforced by the mistakes made by the Party itself in the 1960s and 1970s -- that Conservatives might in the end come to terms with legislative devolution. Indeed, many people both within and outside the Party still believe that legislative devolution would be conceded if significant public support for it emerged.

On party political, as well as on national, grounds the clearest possible repudiation of legislative devolution is now essential. All the other parties in Scotland state clearly that they wish to transfer more power to Scotland. The Conservative Party could not -- even if it wishes (which, in our opinion, it should not) -- appear a more convincing advocate of any form of legislative devolution than its opponents. What it needs to do now is to strike out on a strong, Unionist line of its own -- taking devolution head on -- and so acquire the means to speak in positive terms about the central issue in Scottish politics. Without such a principled position, the Party is bound to appear defensive and unconvincing.

Furthermore, a firm commitment to oppose legislative devolution would instil into the Party's leading supporters and

activists the clear sense of purpose for which they are looking, and end the demoralisation which so many of them feel.

For these reasons, we regard the rejection of legislative devolution as the principal element in the new Conservative approach to Scotland.

ii) Re-examination of the existing administrative devolution

It is high time that an enquiry was made to establish whether the present division of functions between Whitehall and the Scottish Office which came about so unsystematically as has been made clear (see p.5 above) is (a) appropriate; (b) working well; and (c) in the best interests of Scotland and the Union.

In Part 2 we set out the case for reconsidering the existing arrangements. That case seems to us strong enough to warrant a full review of the functions now discharged by the Scottish Office and of its relationship with the other institutions by which the Union as a whole is governed. Such a review:

should be conducted quickly without going through the prolonged public process of seeking evidence from individuals and organisations; and

should focus, as a first step, upon the devolution of economic and industrial responsibilities (including regional policy) where the case for change in Scotland merits close examination. The aim should be to ensure that the organisations concerned with the promotion of economic development are closely co-ordinated with their counterparts in England and Wales; that grants are made on the same basis throughout Great Britain; and that the overall objectives of Conservative economic policy -- efficient markets, free enterprise and steady private sector investment -- are understood throughout the country. In such a strategy, the Scottish Development Agency, which has achieved great success in recent years (notably by taking a much more market-oriented approach to its functions), would continue to have a vital role to play, though we recommend that it now be renamed Scottish Enterprise to signal in the clearest possible way its rejection of indiscriminating, Left-wing interventionism. And to help foster the spirit of enterprise more fully, the new Scottish Enterprise should work closely with the 3i group -- Britain's major provider of finance to small and medium-sized companies -- to enable Scotland to share fully in this major economic initiative.

We believe that the wide-ranging enquiry we recommend could have a number of immediate political advantages:

i) it would give a clear indication of the nature and character of 'positive Unionism', showing that its fundamental aim is to improve the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, not to subordinate Scotland to England;

ii) it would represent a serious initiative in an area where the other Parties have absolutely nothing to say;

iii) it would establish the Conservatives as a Party concerned about the efficient government of Scotland -- wholly ignored by other Parties -- rather than endless constitutional wrangling over legislative devolution;

iv) it would open up a wholly new subject of discussion, and begin the process of altering the political agenda in Scotland with the Conservatives for once leading the way instead of participating in a political debate led by others;

v) coupled with a firm rejection of legislative devolution, it would provide a strong and novel message which could cause the media to start reporting the Party in a positive fashion after years of hostile and dismissive comment. The media could not afford to ignore a bold new Tory agenda for Scotland. .lml

The extent of the administrative change to be carried out after such a review had taken place would need to be carefully judged. Any proposals should be tested against three clear principles:

the need for the greatest possible efficiency in the conduct of Scottish administration;

the need for a better balance between Scottish and British interests; and

the need to secure greater equity in public spending between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, discussed in Part 2.

Objections may be raised on the grounds that any tampering with the functions of the Scottish Office would be deeply resented by opinion in Scotland. This important and obvious criticism can be countered in a number of ways. First, there is no convincing evidence that the people of Scotland attach more significance to the work done by the Scottish Office than to the operations of British Departments in Scotland. For example, student grants do not enjoy huge esteem because they are handled by the Scottish Office unlike the rest of University finance (which is the province of the Department of Education and Science). Furthermore, the transfer of functions from the Scottish Office to Whitehall is not unprecedented. Responsibility for national insurance passed from the Department of Health for Scotland (part of the Scottish Office) to the Ministry of National Insurance in London in 1945. This administrative reorganisation provoked no bitter outcry among the people of Scotland. Any changes that might follow from the kind of enquiry that we are suggesting would of course be designed not to weaken Scotland or diminish its position within the Union, but to improve the system of government in accordance with a clear Unionist philosophy put forward by the Conservative Party. Such a new, confident Unionism would provide a fresh focus for national sentiment and opinion. It is only a defensive, uncertain Unionism that would be unable to gain support for sensible administrative reforms; or allow them to be

misrepresented as in some sense 'anti-Scottish'.

Yet whatever change might take place, the Scottish Office would remain an integral part of the arrangements for governing Scotland, particularly in the three areas permanently assigned to its own national institutions by the Treaty of Union itself -- education, local government and Scottish law (with its remarkable blend of feudal and Roman elements). The issue is not whether there should be administrative devolution, but how far it must go.

iii) Identifying with Scottish traditions and culture

Conservatives have traditionally had great difficulty in gaining full acceptance as part of the mainstream of Scottish affairs. It is often said that they have failed to identify themselves closely with the three great institutions which have shaped the Scottish tradition: the education system, the Church of Scotland and the Law (though they have done rather better with regard to the last of the three).

A policy of 'positive Unionism' will not succeed if it fails to provide within itself adequate scope for the Scottish tradition. Scotland will not be brought successfully within the framework of the Conservative Party unless Conservatives are clearly seen to be imbued with respect and recognition for its distinctive history and outlook.

Everyone knows about the main national characteristics which the three predominant Scottish institutions have done so much to foster over the centuries: personal independence, hard work, thrift, a high degree of social mobility (coupled with a strong commitment to the principle of equality of opportunity), and a deep-seated attachment to the democratic way of doing things (whether in Church, State or everyday life). In the nineteenth century Scotland was a country in which -- according to a typical tale told by John Buchan -- an ordinary Berwickshire shepherd would have no hesitation in rebuking Mr Gladstone. Well-established ladders of opportunity brought crofters' sons to eminence via higher education: by 1910 one third of Glasgow students were working class. Indeed, education was everywhere given a priority (and a clear practical bias) that it lacked in England: Scotland had proportionately twice as many places at university as England in the pre-Robbins era.

The similarity between Thatcherism and the main elements in the Scottish tradition could hardly be clearer. Yet in the nineteenth century Conservatism failed almost entirely in its attempts to become closely associated with the fundamental elements of Scottish life. The country's deepest instincts and values found expression at the political level almost entirely in the Liberal Party (despite the shepherd's rebuke to Mr Gladstone). The split in the Liberal Party over Irish Home Rule in the late 1880s began to change the position by creating a close alliance between the Conservative Party and those Liberals (with whom the Conservatives eventually merged in 1912) who deserted Gladstone over Home Rule. The transformation of the Liberal Party into another Left-wing, statist Party in the twentieth century and its subsequent decline, created an historic

opportunity for the Conservative Party to become at long last the main political embodiment of the Scottish political tradition.

And now Thatcherism -- with its emphasis on standards (of morality as well as efficiency), choice, and enterprise -- has given the Party the policies it needs to seize that opportunity. In the earlier sections of this paper, we put considerable emphasis on the case for reconsidering the manner in which power has been devolved to Scottish institutions: it is equally important to consider the ways in which power and responsibility can be devolved downwards -- through privatisation, the reform of housing, the introduction of new rights for parents in education and so on -- from both the Scottish Office and the British departments to the people of Scotland themselves. In the last half century Socialism has attempted to envelop the Scottish tradition in its own alien doctrines. The task of the Conservative Party is to enable that tradition to flourish and find political expression once again.

The Government's record can, of course, furnish plenty of examples of action which help to safeguard Scottish traditions and culture. But in this area tone and style -- the manner in which Conservatives associate themselves with the Scottish ethos -- are almost as important as action. So more careful thought needs to be given to the manner in which the Conservative Party projects its Scottish identity. Furthermore, at the same time the British dimension needs to be more firmly coupled with recognition of the specifically Scottish elements -- so that, for example, the regeneration of Glasgow is depicted not simply as a Scottish phenomenon but as part of a wider British policy.

What is not needed to create the necessary empathy between Conservatives and the Scottish tradition is the invention of new devices -- flags, anthems and so on. These would be no substitute at all for sustained action aimed at cementing the Scottish tradition more firmly within the Union than ever before.

iv) The assimilation of Scotland within the Conservative framework

The proposals we have outlined above will re-establish Conservatism on a sound Unionist foundation as a positive force in Scottish politics, capable of offering a clear alternative to the policies of the Opposition Parties.

They are also designed to make it much easier for the Government's main political initiatives to be conducted on a general British basis -- certainly in areas like the economy, and also (depending on the outcome of the review of administrative devolution) in other areas too, such as the NHS. It is plainly undesirable for Scotland either to be omitted from the consideration of any issue -- the future of health funding, for example -- or to conduct its own separate review, when the issue needs tackling on a general British basis.

The crucial point here is public spending. The allocation of resources to Scotland by reference to a special national Scottish formula presently underpins that set of separate administrative arrangements which stands in the way of the

sensible consideration of issues on an overall British basis.

It is for this reason that we attach particular importance to our recommendation that the level of public spending in Scotland should depend strictly on identifiable needs.

It is also important to stress that the assimilation of Scotland within the general framework of Conservatism does not mean the total absorption of Scotland in policies devised without proper reference to its own particular requirements. The approach recommended here will make it possible to adapt the main aims and themes of Conservatism to the Scottish context instead of exempting Scotland, or simply ignoring it altogether -- as tends to happen now.

Macaulay wrote:

The Anglo-Saxon and the Celt have been reconciled in Scotland...In Scotland all the great actions of both races are thrown into a common stock, and are considered as making up the glory which belongs to the whole country.

There exists today a real danger that Scotland will cease to regard itself as part of the 'common stock'. The agenda presented here would reverse the developments that have created that danger, and bring Scotland back into the centre of British political life.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to show why the fortunes of the Conservative Party in Scotland have reached their present nadir, and what should be done to restore them. The Party has been content -- often for understandable reasons -- to fight on ground of its opponents' choosing, where the central issues of political debate tend to be public spending and devolution. We have suggested ways in which policies might be developed in order to transform the terms of political debate and so wrest the initiative from the Left. To do that the Party needs, above all, a clear agenda -- and the confidence to put it into effect.

It is by reasserting their Unionism that Conservatives can achieve a decisive change in Scottish politics. This means, first and foremost, that any ideas of legislative devolution must be scrapped once and for all. There is no place for them in an agenda for Conservative recovery in Scotland. Nor can any arrangements -- particularly in the crucial area of public spending -- which tend to weaken the bonds between Scotland and England be accommodated within the 'positive Unionism' proposed here.

Having dealt firmly with the obstacles that stand in the way of Conservative progress, the Party should concentrate on three main questions:

the illogical division of responsibilities between Whitehall and the Scottish Office;

the association of Conservatism with major elements of the Scottish tradition; and

the establishment of an overall British framework within which Scottish interests can be fully accommodated. That would mark the fulfilment and completion of 'positive Unionism'.

Appendix 3: the structure of government in Scotland

British Departments

Treasury

Taxation, interest rates
Departmental appropriations

Board of Inland Revenue

Board of Customs and Excise
Collection of import duties, excise duties, and VAT

Department of Trade and Industry

Regulation of imports and exports
Regulation of companies and insurance
Marine inspection and accidents
Consumer Affairs

Promotion of industry (from July 1975 selective regional assistance was transferred to the Scottish Office)
Relations with shipbuilding, engineering, vehicles, steel and aerospace industries

Posts and Telecommunications (including technological aspects of BBC and IBA. The non-technological side comes under the Home Office with Scottish Office participation)
Linked bodies: British Technology Group, British Steel Corporation, Post Office, British Shipbuilders, Northern Lighthouse Board, Civil Aviation Authority (Highland airports).

Department of Energy

Energy production
Linked bodies: Offshore Supplies Office for Scotland
British Coal (Scottish Area), Atomic Energy Authority (Chapelcross, Dounreay).

Scottish Office

Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland
Land settlement, estate management, regulation of crofting
Agricultural education, advisory service and research

Administration of UK and EEC price support and fisheries policies
Royal Botanic Garden, Edinburgh
Linked bodies: Crofters Commission. Red Deer Commission. Sea Fish Industry Authority, Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce

Scottish Development Department

Local government
Town and country planning, urban renewal, environmental protection
Housing and building control
Water supplies and sewerage
Roads and certain transport functions
North Sea oil infrastructure
Ancient monuments and historic buildings
Linked bodies: Scottish Special Housing Association
Countryside Commission for Scotland, Historic Buildings Council for Scotland, Scottish Transport Group

Industry Department for Scotland

Industrial and economic development
North Sea Oil (North Sea Oil Support Group)
Selective regional assistance to industry and factor building
Manpower Services
New Towns
Electricity
Highland and rural development
Tourism

Department of Employment
Industrial relations, industrial training and employment offices

Department of Transport
Transport (rail and Stranraer-Larne shipping)
Ports, docks, waterways

Department of the Environment
Public Buildings and Works
Linked body: Property Services Agency

Department of Health and Social Security
National insurance, child benefits and other cash benefits

Department of Education and Science
Universities and higher research
Linked bodies: University Grants Committee and Research Councils

Ministry of Defence
Linked bodies: Service establishments and Meteorological Office

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Animal health
Emergency food supply and sponsorship of food-processing industries

Home Office
Aliens, immigration
Explosives
Vivisection, cruelty to animals

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Passports
Attraction of foreign investment

Linked bodies: Scottish Development Agency, Highland and Islands Development Board, New Town Development Corporations, Scottish Tourist Board, North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board, South of Scotland Electricity Board, Manpower Services Commission

Scottish Education Department
Control and development of schools and colleges (no universities).
Includes research, teacher training, student grants
Public libraries, museums and galleries
Youth and Community Services
Recreation and the Arts
Social Work Services Group (child care, probation welfare and mental health)
Linked bodies: Royal Fine Art Commission for Scotland, Royal Scottish Museum, National Galleries of Scotland, National Library of Scotland, National Museum of Antiquities of Scotland, Scottish Sports Council

Scottish Home and Health Department
Law and order (police, fire, civil defence, civil and criminal law, prisons, Royal Prerogative of Mercy, Representation of the people
Regulation of liquor licensing, betting, entertainment
National Health Service (Scottish Health Service) (including school health, health education and public health)
Linked bodies: health boards, Common Services Agency and Scottish Health Service Planning Council
Other linked bodies: Scottish Record Office (Keeper of the Records of Scotland) Department of Registers for Scotland, General Register Office (Registrar General for Scotland), Lord Lyon, Mental Welfare Commission, Lands Tribunal, Scottish Law Commission

Central Services (including legal services, finance, and Scottish Information Office)

Scottish Courts Administration (partly responsible to Lord Advocate)

Cabinet Office
Relations with European Community
Devolution

Lord Advocate's Department
Chief Scottish Law Officer of the Crown (public prosecutions,
legal appointment, drafting of Bills, courts)
Linked body: Scottish Law Commission

Crown Office (criminal prosecutions)
Crown Estate Commissioners


Forestry Commission (HQ in Edinburgh: under Scottish
Secretary in Scotland)

Scottish Economic Council

Scottish Industrial Development Advisory Board

Sources: J 6 The Scottish Political System, Cambridge, 1984, pp 34-36; and Britain 1988 (HMSO), p.56

Appendix 1: Conservative support in England and Scotland 1950-87



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Appendix 2: How Scotland voted 1950-87
 b) The parties' share of the votes

ELECTION YEAR	1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970	1974 (a)	1974 (b)	1979	1985	1987
CON. %	44.8	48.6	50.1	47.2	40.6	37.7	38.0	32.9	24.7	31.4	28.4	24.0
LAB. %	46.2	47.9	46.7	46.7	48.7	49.9	44.5	36.6	36.3	41.6	35.1	42.4
SNP %	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.8	2.4	5.0	11.4	21.9	30.4	17.3	11.8	14.0
LIB % * (+SDP 1983/87)	6.6	2.7	1.9	4.1	7.6	6.8	5.5	8.0	8.3	9.0	24.5	19.2

